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Introduction
If one is to believe much of recent international relations theory, the modern
model of national state sovereignty is under threat from the “post-modern”
forces of transnational globalisation. But if “post-modernity” is an intensifi-
cation of certain modern ideas rather than a new phase of history, perhaps it
is then also the case that the sovereign state and the global market are not
fundamentally opposed. In turn, this raises wider questions about the nature
of sovereignty in relation to the logic of modernity.
This article will examine modern sovereignty from a double perspective.
At the level of theory, it will focus on the fusion of the late medieval, nomi-
nalist dialectic between “the one” and “the many” (the sovereign and the
people) and the early modern, “biopolitical” conception of power (applying
political power to all aspects of human life). Taken together, they constitute
the conceptual foundation of modern sovereignty (sections 1–2). At the prac-
tical level, the article will focus on the joint emergence of the modern state
and the modern market and the religion-democracy-capitalism nexus. The
modern state and the “free market” redefine the sacred and this helps explain
why secular liberal democracy and modern free-market capitalism operate as
“quasi-religions” that undermine and supplant the real religions binding
together communities of faith (sections 3–4).
As such, my thesis is that post-medieval political and economic thought
tends to subordinate the sanctity of life and land to the secular sacrality of the
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state and the market on which secular liberal democracy and modern free-
market capitalism are based. If this is true, then the task for Christian theol-
ogy is not to embrace a particular mode of democratic governance or
capitalist economy but rather to advance models that uphold the sacred
character of life against what Pope John Paul II called the “culture of death”.
The theologically most significant recent example of “economic democracy”
is Pope Benedict XVI’s call for a civil economy in his recent encyclical Caritas
in veritate (section 5).
In part, my argument draws on recent interventions in the ongoing debate
about the modern and the “post-modern”. For instance, in his book We Have
Never Been Modern the French philosopher of science Bruno Latour rejects the
notion that there was an absolute, irreversible break in history that gave rise
to a coherent system of ideas and institutions which we commonly call
“modernity”.2 Instead, Latour identifies an irreducible aporia between human
artifice and unalterable nature at the heart of modern thought and practice. I
will argue that this is in part a legacy of the late Middle Ages which under-
pins early and later modern conceptions as well as practices of state sover-
eignty and market relations, notably the imposition of an artificial and
sovereign order on the violent and anarchic “state of nature”.3
Beyond Latour (and also Foucault’s work on modern “biopolitics”),4 my
argument is that a properly figured Christian theology provides an alterna-
tive vision that views the state and market as embedded in the network of
organic human, social and natural relations which constitute the divinely
created cosmos. By promoting forms of political organisation and economic
activity that uphold the sanctity of life and provide integral development for
all, Christianity outflanks the modern nominalist poles of “the one” linked
with the right and “the many” linked with the left on which the quasi-
sacrality of the modern “market-state” is predicated.
This article does not provide an overview of all models of sovereignty in
the modern era. Rather, it attempts to show how certain theological and
philosophical ideas shaped the conception and institution of modern sover-
eign power, just as changes in political and economic conditions led to
changes in theology and philosophy. The thematic focus on democracy and
capitalism serves to illustrate, first of all, the importance of theological struc-
tures of thought and practice for modern politics and economics (e.g. Adam
Smith and Karl Marx), and, secondly, the mutual, inextricable interaction of
ideational and material factors in explaining historical and contemporary
transformations of politics and economics. On this basis, I hope to make a
contribution to the emerging area of economic theology.
1. Dialectic of Modernity
We are in the midst of another “revolution in sovereignty”.5 The modern
revolutions that replaced medieval monarchical absolutism and feudalism
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with parliamentary democracy and capitalism were a reaction against the
transnational sovereignty of the papacy and the Christian empires in both the
Latin West and the Byzantine East. As such, modernity seems coterminous
with sovereign national states that claim exclusive authority over populations
and territories. Over the last thirty years or so, this model of national state
sovereignty has been under attack from the forces of international law, mul-
tinational corporations, supranational organisations and the global economy.
Therefore, the late modern revolution of globalisation appears to have
changed profoundly and perhaps even irreversibly the exercise of modern
sovereign power.
Leaving aside the anachronistic depiction of the Middle Ages in terms of
feudalism and the divine right of kings,6 a different reading of international
relations and political economy suggests that the tension between the national
and the transnational is internal to modernity itself. For the capitalist system,
which like the national state is modern and not medieval, has favoured
international openmarkets and the freemovement of capital across borders.At
the same time, the modern state could only assert itself against rival forms of
political organisation by promoting financial expansion and new models of
economic accumulation. From its early modern inception in the city-states of
Northern Italy in the fourteenth century, transnational finance capitalism has
been essential to the destruction of old medieval regimes and the creation of
increasinglymodernmodels of governance. So rather thanbeingdiametrically
opposed, the transnational reinforces the national subordination of the local
under the universal. Just as territorial states and de-territorial finance
absorbed autonomous local economies in the modern era, so now national
governments and multinational corporations promote a global economy that
increasingly abstracts from locality by uprooting markets from the coopera-
tive fabric of human relations and associations.
This is not to say that modern state sovereignty has remained unchanged in
the face of the current phase of globalisation. On the contrary, the fusion of
economics and politics—which is apparent throughout the modern age7—
now extends beyond geographical boundaries more than ever before, as
national states are increasingly integrated into a transnational system of
power (of which multinational corporations and supranational institutions
such as the World Trade Organization are key parts). Yet for precisely that
reason, the state—the executive branch of government—remains central to
the exercise of sovereignty.Analogous to Max Weber’s concept of a monopoly
on the legitimate use of physical force that is characteristic of modern state-
hood, at present states retain the prerogative to enforce international agree-
ments, laws and regulations within their mutually exclusive jurisdictions.8 As
such, globalisation does not so much undermine state sovereignty as it
extends the national subsumption of the local to the global.
But one can even go further than this. The fundamental difference in
relation to rival models of sovereignty is surely between the modern and the
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pre-modern, and not between the modern and the “post-modern”. In late
antiquity and much of the Middle Ages, political power tended to be seen as
a divine gift of grace, mediated to human beings via both natural and scrip-
tural revelation and properly received through man’s creative perfection of
nature in which God’s goodness is intimated (Augustine). The telos of politics
was to re-actualise the just and harmonious ordering of God’s original cre-
ation within the polity (Aquinas). As a result of overlapping jurisdictions and
a complex web of intermediary associations such as guilds and fraternities,
political sovereignty tended to be dispersed and diffused.9
Modernity, by contrast, emphasises God’s absolute omnipotence and the
absence of any trace of divine goodness in the natural world (Ockham). The
function of politics is to impose an artificial order on the irreducible violence
of nature, based either upon a social contract (Hobbes and Locke) or upon
pre-contractual, mutually balancing passions and moral sentiments (Hume
and Smith). By establishing the pre-eminence of the state over the church and
the mediating institutions of civil society, political sovereignty becomes
increasingly centralised and concentrated.10
Conceptually, modernity fuses the juridical-constitutional model of
supreme state authority (vis-à-vis the Christian empires, the papacy and the
national churches) with a new, “biopolitical” account of power whereby
natural life itself and the living body of the individual are now the object of
politics and are subject to state authority and control.11 Because it views life as
fundamentally violent (Hobbes’s state of nature) and void of any transcen-
dent finality (from Newton’s physics to Darwin’s biology), modern “biopoli-
tics” restricts the church to care for peoples’ souls. Their physical bodies are
handed over to the state and, increasingly, the market. In practice, modern
sovereign power takes the form of coercion for the purposes of what Michel
Foucault calls the subjective individualisation of “each” (singulatim) and the
objective totalisation of “all” (omnes).12 By this, he refers to the state’s dual
control of human beings as bare individuals (rather than integral members of
communities) and of society as a uniform collective—rather than a social and
political body that blends communality with individuation. On this basis,
Foucault exposes the falsity of the myth that modernity is wholly progressive
and that it replaced medieval monism with a new pluralism secured by the
authority of the national state and the freedom of the transnational market.
Foucault’s distinction of “all” and “every single one” (omnes et singulatim)
is significant for the question of sovereignty on another account. The mutu-
ally reinforcing tendency of the state to reduce human beings to bare indi-
viduals and subject them to uniformising practices by creating and
expanding centralised medical, educational and penal institutions indicates
that the duality between the individual and the collective is also internal to
the logic of modernity.13 Here one can suggest that modern sovereign power
is even more problematic than Foucault suspected. For the modern state and
the market weakened the mediation of “the few” at the local level in favour
Modern Sovereignty in Question 573
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
of “the one” at the sovereign centre and “the many” linked by a social
contract or collective unity. In the long and uneven process of modernisation,
intermediary institutions were progressively stripped of their autonomy and
their cooperative fraternity with other intermediary institutions within and
across imperial and national borders. Henceforth, localities and their con-
stituent bodies became increasingly dependent on a single sovereign and
entered into rivalry with other associations—beginning with the competition
between merchants and bankers that led to frequent war between the Italian
city-states of Genoa, Florence, Venice and Milan in the fourteenth and the
fifteenth century.14
Since modern states and markets asserted their unitary sovereign power
over and against both universal religious bodies and local self-organisation,
the double duality of the modern (individual-collective and national-
transnational) can therefore be said to be inscribed into a wider dialectic
between “the one” and “the many”. Both these poles are “nominalist” in the
sense that they deny primary relations between the ruler and the ruled based
on the ontological reality of a universal common good in which all can share
byparticipating inmediating institutions (rather than relations based either on
a social contract or on pre-rational moral sentiments).15 Since these nominalist
poles and the spectrum of possibilities which they contain tend to privilege
abstract individuality over embodied communality, it is now possible to
suggest that other foundational categories ofmodernpolitics and international
relations are also linked from the outset to this dialectic of “the one” and the
“many”. The “left” and the “right”, “liberals” and “conservatives”, “the
private” and “public” or “authoritarianism” and “democracy” have all been
defined in terms of either unity or diversity, but without any reference to the
primary relations that characterize the natural and the human realm.16 In other
words, modernity defines itself in term of a closed and purely immanent
formalism that denies symbolic intimations of abiding truths and hierarchical
values and thereby diminishes reality in all its mysterious depth.
As a result of this formalism, the distinction affirmed in each of these
categories risks collapsing into a purely nominal difference. In practice, all the
modern conceptual dualities tend at some point to dissolve and enter a zone of
“in-distinction” where nominal differences remain in place but where real
distinctions disappear. “Left” and “right”, “democracy” and “authoritarian-
ism”, or “state” and “market” can converge and collude at the expense of
genuine alternatives. For example, the formal continuation and even expan-
sion of democratic rule is entirely compatible with an accelerating decline in
popular participation and a growing concentration of power in the hands of
old elites andnewclasseswhich serve the interests of corporate business at the
expense of the wider public good.17 In the words of Sheldon Wolin, this marks
“the political coming of age of corporate power and the politicaldemobilization
of the citizenry”,18 whereby democracy becomes increasingly managed and
flips over into something like “inverted totalitarianism”.
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What is in question, then, is the nominalist and formalist underpinning of
modern politics and the sovereign power of the modern state and market. As
I argue in the following section, the conceptual origins of nominalism and
formalism can be traced to the late medieval theology and philosophy of
William of Ockham and the work of influential modern thinkers such as
Francisco Suárez and Thomas Hobbes.
2. The Theological Foundations of Modern Sovereignty: Ockham,
Suárez and Hobbes
It has been suggested by a growing number of scholars that the transition
from the Middle Ages to the modern era was the product of a series of shifts
within Christian theology in the late thirteenth and the early fourteenth
century, notably the move from metaphysical realism and intellectualism to
nominalism and voluntarism.19 In this section, I will chart a brief genealogical
account of sovereignty from Ockham via Suárez to Hobbes. The aim is not to
provide a comprehensive discussion of their works but rather to highlight the
link between their writings and explore the impact of changes in theological
ideas and political conditions on conceptions and practices of sovereign
power.
2.1. Ockham
With John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308) and William of Ockham (c. 1288–1348),
the dominant patristic and medieval theory that the universe is created by
divine ideas in God’s mind (intellectualism) and that transcendent universals
are present in particular things (realism) was gradually replaced with the
belief that God’s will is the ultimate principle of being (voluntarism) and that
universals are merely mental concepts or names (nominalism). Taken
together, nominalism and voluntarism transform the status of being and the
meaning of power which are essential for the concept of sovereignty.
By rejecting Aquinas’s account of analogical being in favour of univocal
being, Scotus elevates a neutral category over the distinction between Creator
and creation and effectively erases the ontological and analogically mediated
difference between the infinite God and finite beings. Since all beings share
the same substance of which the Creator has more and creation has less,
univocal being is now the ground of all existence and created objects can be
known without reference to God.20 Likewise, by denying the reality of tran-
scendent universals in immanent things, Ockham restricts human knowl-
edge of divine self-revelation in the world to uncertain intuition and
experience.21 And by subordinating divine intellect to divine will, he also
separates God’s volition from the incarnate logos and natural law. The com-
bined result of univocal being and the unreality of universals is to introduce
a split between Creator and creation and to privilege divine intervention in
the world through God’s omnipotent will at the expense of nature infused by
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divine grace and wisdom (as for much of patristic and medieval theology).
Ockham’s nominalist and voluntarist theology is of special significance for
the genesis of the dominant modern model of sovereign power because it
establishes the primacy of the individual over the universal and posits a
radical separation between the infinite eternal and the finite temporal
“realm”, which provides the foundation for state supremacy vis-à-vis the
church and all other institutions within the temporal-spatial realm of the
saeculum.
First, Ockham views God’s absolute, unmediated power (potentia Dei abso-
luta) as that which keeps all beings in separate existence, without any unify-
ing bond of being.22 Based on this ontological priority of the individual,
Ockham denies the reality of universals in things and limits universality to
concepts in the mind alone. Universals are mental names (nomina mentalia) of
concepts and not real “things” in actually existing beings.23 Individuality is an
essential property that belongs to a thing immediately and intrinsically — not
in virtue of any relation with anything else. He holds that existence and
essence are merely nominal distinctions, for otherwise potentia Dei absoluta
could maintain both separately in being.As the noun and the verb of the same
thing, res and esse have identical signification. The whole of reality is radically
singular and as such cannot communicate anything at all: “[. . .] there is
nothing in [any two individuals] that is one and the same: whatever is in one
simply and absolutely of itself is not something that exists in another”.24 Both
the Creator and his creation have being, but for Ockham this warrants neither
Augustine’s definition of God as the highest being in which all other beings
share nor Aquinas’s divine act of being that brings all things into existence
and makes them what they are. Instead, Ockham’s nominalist ontology
posits a strict duality between the one sovereign omnipotent God and the
individual many.
The reason for this “ontological individualism” is of course theological.
Ockham contends that after the Fall there is no metaphysical link between
God and the world. This absence of primary relations extends to all beings
within creation. Different beings can be called animals, not because they
participate in a really existing universal called “animality” or “animal-ness”,
but because their individual essences exhibit a certain similarity that can be
described by the mind as a universal. This similarity is generic (for all
animals) or specific (for all humans), but in either case no primary, ontologi-
cal relation pertains between individual beings. Besides the individuality of
each and everything, there is only the overriding absolute power of God’s
seemingly arbitrary will. In the post-lapsarian world, God grants humans
two powers: to designate those who rule and to appropriate only individual
(rather than also communal) property.25 In this way, he lays the theological
and philosophical foundations for the primacy of the individual over the
universal in which all can participate. Any form of commonality is now based
on individual power and not on a shared divine gift of being.
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Second, Ockham’s political thought largely mirrors his ontology. Secular
authority comes from God via the people. As such, he fuses elements of
hieronic sovereignty (power descending from above) with elements of
popular sovereignty (power ascending from below). Nevertheless Ockham,
like his fellow secularists and their papist opponents, argues for the unity of
governmental rule. A single monarchy is the most appropriate regime
because it combines the unity of “the sovereign one” with the freedom of “the
many” who are born as individuals and who are invested with the power of
designating their ruler. In principle, secular sovereignty is not absolute, as
the monarch can be legitimately corrected or deposed.26 Likewise, the empire
is not a unitary state but instead accommodates kingdoms, dukedoms and
autonomous groups.
However, in practice, the emperor rules over the entire temporal sphere,
and the common good which he has the obligation to defend tends to serve
the interests of the state against the transnational papacy and the national
church. The reason is that for Ockham, church authority comes from Christ
and his apostles who all refused to have any civil jurisdiction or political
power. As such, the church has no legitimate temporal power in her own
right. Ockham, like Marsilius of Padua (c. 1270–1342), argues that whenever
the pope or the clergy exercise temporal jurisdiction, they can only do so by
the will of the people.27 In effect, it is the monarch’s God-given duty to defend
the independence of temporal realm vis-à-vis the papacy and the church. By
contrast, Aquinas develops a more mediated account of papal plenitudo
potestatis in the political sphere. Ockham equates the temporal sphere with
coercive jurisdiction which is a monopoly of the state. In consequence, eccle-
siastical sentences based on papal and clerical authority have no legal force
without the sanction of the secular authorities.
In the name of individual freedom and monarchical sovereign power,
ecclesiastical power is subordinated to the state and the authority of the
papacy is curtailed.28 (On Ockham’s advice, King Louis of Bavaria used this
argument to limit the imperial jurisdiction of the papacy in his dispute with
Pope John XXII.)29 As a result, state sovereignty is no longer framed by the
church, and religious limits on secular power are progressively loosened. As
Janet Coleman concludes, the consequence is that
secular politics not only has its own process of self-correction, but that it
is independent of ecclesial power [. . .]. Because the temporal sphere is
imperfect, he [Ockham] argued that secular sovereignty, once estab-
lished, could be legitimate even when “absolute”, in that there need not
be regular participation of the people in government, nor need there be
institutions to restrain the power of kings.30
Ockham’s political philosophy is therefore governed by the unilateral link
between “the sovereign one” and “the many”, as reflected in the primacy of
the individual over the universal and the supremacy of the state over the
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church. These ideas tend to remove religious limits on secular politics and to
legitimate the de facto absolute power of monarchs. Since the temporal realm
is monopolised by the state at the expense of the church and other interme-
diary institutions that mediate the vision of a substantive common good as
partaking of the highest good in God, Ockham’s account of popular sover-
eignty cannot prevent monarchical absolutism.
2.2. Suárez
Like Ockham, the influential sixteenth-century theologian Francisco Suárez
(1548–1616) rejects the doctrine of the divine right of kings but his alternative
is no less secular in nature. Key to his account of power is the argument that
political authority and legitimacy must be grounded in reason, revelation
and popular sovereignty. In this sense, Suárez does not embrace Ockham’s
ontological nominalism. However, his formalist conception of the political
community also eliminates primary relations between the people and the
sovereign and ultimately shifts power irreversibly from “the many” to “the
one”. According to Suárez, imperial decrees are only binding insofar as they
correspond to the exigencies of reason and the truth of revelation. Likewise,
sovereignty emanates from the people:
this [legislative] power, viewed solely according to the nature of things,
resides not in any individual man but rather in the whole body of
humankind [. . .]. In the nature of things all men are born free, so that,
consequently, no person has political jurisdiction over another person,
even as no person has dominion over another. Nor is there any reason
why such power should [simply] in the nature of things be attributed to
certain persons over certain other persons, rather than vice-versa.31
In other words, sovereignty is grounded in the social and political body
composed of free individuals. The unity of the “body politic” is neither the
result of arbitrary divine intervention nor the product of a social contract but
rather the outcome of an original investment of the people with the power
that is from God (potestas a deo). Suárez, not unlike Ockham, argues that the
authority and legitimacy of the monarch derives exclusively from this divine
gift of power to the people and not directly from God’s unilateral sanction.32
So by locating the source of monarchical power in popular sovereignty,
Suárez rejects the secular doctrine of the divine right of kings.
Even though Suárez avoids Ockham’s ontological nominalism, his own
metaphysics is equally problematic because it eschews the shared patristic
and medieval Neo-Platonist idea of a hierarchical ordering of the universe
and the polity in favour of a modern formalistic account of popular unity.
Without any degrees of being or goodness, the created order tends to dissolve
into a flattened whole. Lacking in differentiation and in individuation, the
people constitute a “single mystical body” (unum corpus mysticum)—a purely
human unity that is prior to the ecclesia, the universal Church founded upon
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the Body of Christ. For this reason, Suárez effectively secularises the joint
patristic and medieval vision of the corpus mysticum as the highest commu-
nity on earth—the profound and permanent spiritual union within the
Church in the reciprocal love of the Holy Spirit, as Saint Paul put it (Eph. 4:16,
5:27; Rom. 5:5).
Whereas Aquinas draws a real distinction between the theological commu-
nity of the corpus mysticum and the secular realm of political governance,
Suárez posits a formal distinction within a real identity. In other words, the
theological body is conflated with the secular body and the mystical body
now denotes principally the population and not the ecclesial community. In
consequence, the natural organic unity of the social body takes precedence
over the supernatural spiritual unity of the theological body (which for
Aquinas is mediated to the created world through divinely infused grace). As
a result, the operation of the corpus mysticum is severed from God’s act of
being and the purely natural realm is sundered from God.33 Sovereignty is
therefore defined as a one-off, unilateral transfer of power from God to the
world and not as a continuous, reciprocal—though asymmetrical—primary
relation between the Creator and his creation.
The work of Suárez has two consequences for the conception of modern
sovereignty. First of all, the mystical community as a political body is cut off
from the divine act of being and from God’s infused grace. This is because the
operation of the human secular sphere is independent of divine activity and
instead dependent upon the sovereign “will of all who were assembled
therein [in the community]”.34 Secondly, the political community is not
unified and sustained by any collective “drive” to the supernatural, as it is in
Aquinas’s account of corpus mysticum.35 Likewise, the priority of the organic
body over the political body implies that the “state of nature” is somehow
apolitical because politics is no longer an integral part of human activity but
rather the exclusive realm of sovereign state power (as for Ockham).
The constitution of a common polity is in some fundamental sense counter-
natural and as such involves alienation (alienatio).36 The reason is that the
formation of political communities and the transfer of sovereignty from the
people to the ruler are irreversible and entail the abandonment (largitio) of
power (Aquinas, by contrast, insists that proper political rule involves some
measure of popular assent and involvement and that tyrants can legitimately
be overthrown).37 And since that transfer is irreversible, the constitution of a
political community embodies the permanent alienation of its constituents:
“Even though the king has received his authority from the people by dona-
tion or contract, the people is no longer entitled to strip the king of it nor to
reclaim its freedom”,38 for this would be an illegitimate usurpation. In short,
permanent alienation and the irretrievable abandonment of popular power
constitute the ultimate basis for monarchical sovereignty.
There is thus a paradox at the heart of Suárez’s conception of sovereign
power. On the one hand, he opposes the divine right of kings in the name of
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popular sovereignty. But on the other hand, he reinforces Ockham’s case for
a unilateral transfer of power from the people to the monarch by arguing that
this transfer is necessarily irrevocable. The account of sovereignty in terms of
popular power uniquely bestowed by God and uniquely transferred to the
sovereign amounts to a theological defence of secular authority over the
entire citizenry that is characteristic of the modern state. In contrast to
Aquinas’s distinction between the church as corpus mysticum and the state as
“body politic”, Suárez’s conception of the population as a “single mystical
body” replaces the patristic and medieval primacy of the ecclesial community
over the state with the early modern supremacy of the state over the people.
Though Suárez rejects the divine right of kings, he emphasizes absolute state
sovereignty and the primacy of the governing king over the church. This
provides the conceptual basis for the sacralisation of the state.39
2.3. Hobbes
By claiming that individuality precedes and grounds communality, both
Ockham and Suárez strengthen the role of “the one” and “the many” at the
expense of “the few”. As such, late medieval and early modern theology
conceptualises the dialectic of the individual and the collective that frames
the dominant modern model of sovereignty.40 Ockham’s nominalist and vol-
untarist theology is central to the emergence of “biopolitics” for at least two
reasons. First, the erasure of God from the perceptible universe negates the
patristic and medieval idea that even after the Fall the biblical primacy of
divinely created peace over human violence is dimly reflected in the struc-
tures of the natural and the social realm.41 Second, it establishes the primacy
of God’s absolute power (which is fideistically believed) over the divine
ordering of the universe (which is mediated through natural law). That the
thought of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is deeply indebted to late medieval
nominalism and voluntarism is clear from his emphasis in the Leviathan on
will and artifice rather than reason and nature as the foundational categories
of political philosophy. Moreover, Hobbes’ epistemological scepticism leads
him to argue that human reasoning cannot provide natural knowledge of
supernatural ends in God. Instead, the nominalist denial of real universals in
particulars and the voluntarist account of both divine and human nature—
taken together—suggest that individuality is more fundamental than com-
munality. These two philosophical commitments also underpin his claim that
modern, centralised authority of the “sovereign one” is more clearly compat-
ible with the individual freedom of “the many” than the medieval idea of the
rule by “the few” who know.42
Even more clearly than Ockham and Suárez, Hobbes links potentia Dei
absoluta to sovereignty. First of all, the denial of real universals means that
both God and the created structures of the world remain hidden from human
cognition. We cannot know the world as it really is. All that we experience are
the effects of the world upon our passions and our intellect. In line with
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certain strands of Calvinist theology, Hobbes believes that the post-lapsarian
condition is one of permanent violence. In the “state of nature”, life is “soli-
tary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” because “man is a wolf to man” (homo
homini lupus) and there is a “war of all against all” (bellum omnium contra
omnes).43 Even if this original threat of violent death does not describe an
epoch in history but instead constitutes a principle that is internal to the state
(evident only at the hypothetical moment of its dissolution), it remains the
case that Hobbes’s acceptance of a nominalist ontology leads him to posit
violence as more fundamental to life than peace.
Second, since he assumes a natural state of disorder that cannot be over-
come (because no other knowledge of the world is available to us), Hobbes
can only imagine the imposition of an artificial order—the commonwealth—
that merely regulates the violence of life (rather than resolving violence
through peace by way of the creative perfection of a more fundamental
natural, created order—as for Augustine or Aquinas). Even though Hobbes
distinguishes the commonwealth by free, contractual institution from the
commonwealth by forceful, violent acquisition, in either case the sovereign
has supreme power to “give life” or to withdraw it from his subjects. Simi-
larly, obedience to the sovereign is always for fear of a violent death.44
Third, since man is driven by fear of violent death and self-interested
self-preservation, peace (or rather the absence of open conflict) can only be
enforced through the absolute authority of the Leviathan. Beyond Ockham
and Suárez, Hobbes’s commonwealth does not just elevate the state over the
church but also subjects the multiplicity of the people to a uniform social
contract that purports to be their single will:
A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or
one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one
of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of representer, not the
unity of the represented, that maketh the person one.45
As such, the “sovereign one” embodies the unity of “the many”, without
however offering a genuine body politic that upholds its members qua
members of a transcendent whole.
Fourth, because we cannot know any alternative natural order either
through reason or faith, human beings are compelled to submit obediently to
the supreme sovereignty of the Leviathan. Once more, it is divine omnipo-
tence that legitimates this arrangement and sanctifies the extension of central
power to all realms of life and to the preservation or extinction of individual
existences. Here we can clearly see the modern “biopolitical” imperative.
Finally, the absence of a proper body politic also explains how Hobbes’s
nominalist ontology (and anthropology) leads him to view man as nothing
but an owner of himself, an individual who does not stand in relations of
mutuality or reciprocity with fellow human beings. As a result, Hobbes tends
to define social relations in proprietary terms, largely independent of com-
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munal bonds governed by substantive values of peace and justice.46 Such
values are unavailable to Hobbes because his nominalist denial of real uni-
versals in the world commits him to rely on fear and domination in order to
impose an artificial order on mutually distrustful citizens.
In summary, without an account of a transcendent Good that orders all
immanent things, Hobbes can only appeal to the unitary power of the Levia-
than who exercises absolute control through fear and submission. Justice no
longer denotes the harmonious ordering of real relations amongst members
of the body politic (as it does for Augustine and Aquinas), but is reduced to
contractual obligation. As such, the omnipotent Leviathan and “sovereign
market relations” enforce the coexistence of individual, rival “self-
proprietors”. In Hobbes, the modern model of state and market sovereignty
begins to converge and to form the nominalist horizon that encompasses the
modern dialectic between “the one” and “the many”.47 It is within this
nominalist horizon that politics becomes “biopolitics” and that sovereign
power is redefined as dominion over life.
3. State and Market Sovereignty in the Modern Epoch:
A Brief Genealogical Account
In this and the following section, I relate the theoretical analysis of modern
sovereignty in terms of nominalist “biopolitics” to the practical analysis of the
state and the market and also the link between secular liberal democracy and
late modern capitalism. I provide a brief theological genealogy of the modern
model of political and economic sovereignty. My argument is that this model
was never limited to state authority or national self-determination. Instead, by
encompassing the system of inter-state relations and cross-border economic
exchange, modern sovereignty was always political and legal as well as
economic. Moreover, this model subsumed the individual and the communal
under a system of power distribution divided between national state author-
ity and transnational market activity. The conception and institution of this
modern model of sovereignty was the product of three revolutions that were
to some considerable extent shaped by theological concepts and changes in
religious institutions and practices, just as those ideas and customs were
influenced by political, social and economic factors.
First, the long and uneven transition from the Middle Ages to early moder-
nity gradually replaced the late medieval pluriverse of horizontal and over-
lapping relationships with a new “power vertical” of absolutist monarchs
who commanded unprecedented fiscal control and military might.48 In the
words of Charles Tilly, “[w]ar made the state, and the state made war”.49 The
reason for the centrality of warfare was both theological and political: the
states that emerged after the demise of medieval Christendom sought to
establish their sovereign authority against the transnational papacy (as in the
previously mentioned case of King Louis of Bavaria who was advised by
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Ockham). By appealing to the secular doctrine of the divine right of kings,
other early modern monarchs like James VI of Scotland (James I of England)
sought to accrue what they saw as their god-given power and legitimacy.50
The state sovereignty of monarchical absolutism was grounded in a curtailing
of national ecclesial and transnational papal power.
Early modern relations of centralized authority and territorial jurisdiction
produced a variety of distinct yet related models of the sovereign national
state and the sovereign market. In spite of significant differences, absolutist
sovereignty in France and proto-capitalist sovereignty in England were both
part of a shift from a more diffuse to a more unitary form of sovereign
power—abstract standards such as formal rights and proprietary relations
based on the monarch and the market. As a number of Marxist historians like
Fernand Braudel, Perry Anderson, Robert Brenner, Charles Tilly and Gio-
vanni Arrighi have argued, national state creation and the emergence of
capitalist economies were linked from the outset. Indeed, the early modern
revolution in sovereignty gave rise to what has been described as “the two
interdependent master processes of the [modern] era: the creation of a system
of national states and the formation of a worldwide capitalist system”.51 But
since Marxism tends to endorse some variant of historical materialism, it
ignores both the nature of pre-modern modes and the interaction between
theological ideas or religious practices and other ideational and material
factors in the formation of modern arrangements. The modern revolution in
sovereignty was not a passage from ossified feudalism to oppressive abso-
lutism, as Susan Reynolds and other historians have documented.52 Much
rather, the high and late Middle Ages are more accurately described in terms
of a “complex space” and a dynamic order in which sovereign relations of
authority were multilateral and reciprocal among a vast array of institutions
and groups—including the church, the local city-state, professional guilds,
trans-national monastic orders, cross-border trading networks and agrarian
communities.53 The mark of (early) modern models of sovereignty is that
political power tended to be more centralised and economic power more
concentrated than in the late medieval period.
The second revolution in sovereignty was properly modern and no less
theological than the first. Long before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, it was
the fall of the “Byzantine Commonwealth” in 1453 and the rise of the Prot-
estant Reformation in the early sixteenth century which destroyed the rem-
nants of late medieval Christendom in East and West and heralded the
advent of modern international relations.54 The Peace of Augsburg in 1555
granted monarchs and their vassals a formal power monopoly at the expense
of the supranational papacy and a transnational network of monastic orders
and local churches. Henceforth, sovereignty was largely secularised and
came to denote the supreme authority over territory, population, social rela-
tions and property. By codifying the principle “cuius regio, eius religio” (in the
Prince’s land, the Prince’s religion), it was national princes who politicised
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faith and rejected the universalism of the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox
Church.
Reinforced by the Peace of Westphalia, the separation of religion from
politics and the concomitant idea of national self-determination subordinated
the church to the state. In so doing, it elevated popular sovereignty over above
divine sovereignty as mediated in and through the ecclesial body (a funda-
mental shift first conceptualised by Francisco Suárez, as I have suggested).
This modern revolution in sovereignty culminated in the Peace of Utrecht in
1713,when Britain abandonedmilitary-mercantilist interventionism in favour
of an imperial power balance. Unlike the protectionist policies of mercantil-
ism, the new approach extended the reach of capital across the world through
non-reciprocal commodities trade because itwas based on agrarian capitalism
that financed naval supremacy through surplus extraction and tax-collection.55
Coupledwith the end ofmonarchical absolutism and the passage to sovereign
parliamentarianism, this shift in British foreign policy inaugurated the
modern system of international relations.56 The new system combined
national, territorial sovereignty with capitalist, de-territorial sovereignty (a
point which I expand upon in the following section).
The third revolution in sovereignty occurred after the advent of Enlight-
enment modernity and was also shaped by theological structures of thought
and practice. The Enlightenment, itself the product of religious struggles,57
promised emancipation from the constricting shackles of absolute monarchi-
cal and clerical rule. But after the French Revolution, the secular republic not
only dispossessed the church and dissolved the monasteries. It also legislated
on all intermediary bodies such as guilds and other corporations, thereby
removing any independent mediation between the sovereign state and the
autonomous individual citizen. As a result, both religion and civil society in
France and elsewhere in Europe were progressively stripped of their
autonomy. Together with the Napoleonic Wars and the Wars of Liberation,
this paved the way for the expansion of capitalism to the rest of Western
Europe and the opening of domestic markets to international “free trade”58—
another indication of how closely the modern national state and the transna-
tional market have been intertwined.
Moreover, after 1848 classical liberalism married laissez-faire economics
with liberal democracy. This alliance helped produce the first form of glo-
balisation and economic inter-dependence towards the end of the nineteenth
century. Founded upon a new notion of national self-determination and
transnational capital expansion, state sovereignty and market relations
assumed pre-eminence over local autonomy and the national capital controls
under mercantilism. With hegemony passing from Britain to the USA after
1914, the promotion of “liberal market democracy” was no longer exclusively
in the hegemon’s national, strategic interest but instead came to be portrayed
as America’s universal mission in the world—a fusion of moral and messi-
anic idealism with pragmatic realism and the realpolitik of power projection.59
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Crucially, this happened with the approval and connivance of actual religion.
Rather than appealing to alternative modes of authority and legitimacy, some
strands of Puritanism and Calvinism sanctified the pursuit of government-
sponsored market interest. By preaching a gospel of prosperity and conflat-
ing the elect with the wealthy, they distorted traditional Christianity and
aligned these Protestant traditions with a political and economic liberalism
that would take an increasingly secular direction in the sense of subordinat-
ing theological and civil virtues as well as religious and civic practices to the
spirit of acquisitiveness and the commercial society.60
However, the secularisation of the concept of sovereignty that ultimately
underpins the three modern revolutions does not signify the decline or even
the absence of religion. Instead, the secular turn of modernity is more accu-
rately understood as a change in theology and philosophy and not a progres-
sive liberation from religious structures of thought and practice.61 More
specifically, both democracy and capitalism operate like quasi-religions, in
this sense that they redefine the sacred, as I argue in the following section.
4. The Religion-Democracy-Capitalism Nexus
The previous section highlighted some of the theological concepts and reli-
gious reasons that underpinned the rise of the modern state and “interna-
tional market relations”. I also briefly traced the convergence of democracy
and capitalism to the third modern revolution in sovereignty, when Britain
and then the USA used international “free trade” and capital expansion in
order to buttress their hegemonic position in the inter-state system. In this
section, I examine the link between democracy and capitalism from a philo-
sophical and theological perspective. My argument is that both Adam Smith
(1723–1790) and Karl Marx (1818–1883)—arguably the two most influential
political economists—fail to account for the conceptual foundation of demo-
cratic rule and capitalist economies, above all the subordination of the sacred
to formal rights and standards of abstract value, as Karl Polanyi was first to
argue. The commodification of life and land which he associates with capi-
talism also extends to modern liberal secular democracy.
4.1. Marx and Smith
According to Marx, the nexus between capitalism and the state is the bour-
geoisie. Its self-interest and insatiable greed requires the constant expansion
of markets and the removal of local resistance, if necessary by the violent
means of central state power. There is thus a direct link between capitalism
and the national subsumption of the local under the universal. Moreover,
Marx and Engels argue in the Communist Manifesto that the need for perma-
nent market extension drives the bourgeoisie to establish connections “over
the whole surface of the globe”. In this process, “the old local and national
seclusion and self-sufficiency” give way to “intercourse in every direction,
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universal interdependence of nations”. In a famous paragraph of the Mani-
festo, Marx and Engels warn that the bourgeoisie “compels all nations, on
pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels
them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become
bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image”.62
The transnational nature of capitalism therefore reinforces the national sub-
ordination of the local to the global. In this way, Marx posits a link between
capitalism and state based on relations of production whereby (according to
the conceptual terms of the present essay) “the bourgeois few” exploit “the
proletarian many” with the complicit collusion of “the sovereign one”.
However, it was Adam Smith who first conceptualised the connection
between the extension of state power and the global spread of capitalism.
Long before Marx, he saw that the accumulation of capital would cause a
falling rate of profit both nationally and internationally due to increased
competition. This gives legislators and governments an indispensable role in
protecting and promoting private business. The aim of central intervention is
neither to maximize corporate profit nor to fill the state’s coffers but rather to
generate what Smith called “plentiful revenue or subsistence for the
people”.63 The link between democracy and capitalism is the unintended
positive consequence of expanding the international division of labour
through trade (promoted by “the sovereign one” and “the bourgeois few”)
for the welfare and prosperity of “the many”. In the words of Smith,
By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by
enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s
enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, [the] general ten-
dency [i.e. of the great discoveries of America and the passage to the East
Indies] would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the
east andWest Indies, all the commercial benefitswhichhave resulted from
those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which
they have occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen
rather from accidents than from anything in the nature of those events
themselves. At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the
superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans
that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in
those remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries
may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhab-
itants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality
of courage of forcewhich, by inspiringmutual fear, can alone overawe the
injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of
one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality
of force than the mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of
improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all
countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it.64
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Smith’s faith in the positive effects of global trade on the welfare of the many
poor (not just the wealthy few) has led to a new interpretation of his political
economy. According to a number of philosophers, economists and historians
such as Amartya Sen, Knud Haakonssen, David Raphael, Emma Rothschild,
Andrew Skinner and Donald Winch, Smith was neither a theorist of self-
regulating markets, nor an advocate of “free-market” capitalism as an engine
of boundless economic prosperity, nor a defender of the kind of division of
labour that occurs in the pin factory described in the opening chapter of The
Wealth of Nations.65 Instead, he viewed the market as an instrument of gov-
ernment (rather than vice-versa). As a result, Smith seems to have been
primarily concerned with the moral foundations of social existence and
believed that the “invisible hand of the market” is at the service of intellectual
emancipation and social progress, blending individual autonomy and collec-
tively exercised sovereignty.
Coupled with his critique of windfall profits and hereditary privilege,
Smith’s defence of economic liberty has to be seen, so the argument goes, as
an advocacy of political enlightenment and a promotion of compassion and
benevolence in order to bolster civil society. (This project was further devel-
oped by his fellow Scotsman Adam Ferguson and later carried forward by
Hegel.) This new interpretation of Smith’s political economy has recently
been taken further by Giovanni Arrighi who argues that Smith makes a
double distinction: first, between a properly functioning market economy
and the exploitation of the capitalist system; second, between a benign state
that pursues social goals and the “will-to-power” of Europe’s successive
imperial powers that plundered colonies and enriched the ruling classes.66 As
Smith put it in the above-quoted passage, the Europeans “were enabled to
commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries”. In
this way, he appears to defend a state-regulated market economy against both
medieval “robber-baron” feudalism and modern mercantilist capitalism. In
short, Marx’s historical materialism was to some extent anticipated and even
surpassed by Smith’s moral philosophy and political economy. This sort of
re-interpretation has the twin effect of relativising the importance of Marxism
and also distancing Smith and his legacy from the worst excesses of contem-
porary neo-liberalism in the vein of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Fried-
man. Accordingly, Smith’s defence of “fellow-feeling”, sympathy and
benevolence contrasts sharply with the celebration of individual emancipa-
tion by both old Marxists and neo-liberals who appear to embrace the kind of
Lockean ontological atomism that had been resoundingly rejected by Smith
in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.
However, neither Smith’s nor Marx’s critique of “free-market” economics
can account for the conceptual nature and historical origins of capitalism and
its implications for sovereignty. Just as Marx failed to take into account
Smith’s argument that world market formation is driven primarily by legis-
lators and governments (not the owners of capital alone), Smith failed to
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anticipate Marx’s point that “primitive accumulation” is the pre-condition for
the initial creation of a capitalist economy. In other words, the key argument
made by Marx is that capitalism can only arise in conditions where there is
mass-scale expropriation of the people, as exemplified by the “enclosure” of
commonly owned land in England beginning at the end of the fifteenth
century when “free peasant proprietors” were driven off their property by
“feudal” lords.67 Based on his theory of capitalist commodity exchange for
the sake of a higher monetary value of assets (rather than a higher commodity
purchasing power, as Smith had assumed), Marx contended that the per-
petual accumulation of money is the supreme instrument for ever-growing
bourgeois class power. But by focusing on social class, Marx was unable to
explain why some states such as the British Empire and later the USA pro-
moted the formation of a worldwide capitalist market economy, whereas
other economic powers like pre-nineteenth-century China did not. More
fundamentally, by restricting “primitive accumulation” to “feudal” expro-
priation, Marx failed to understand that this mechanism is not just the pre-
condition for the emergence of capitalism but its very condition of possibility
because the monetary value of assets becomes increasingly disconnected
from the underlying value of commodities.
In other words, “primitive accumulation” as expropriation is not simply an
initial event. Rather, it constitutes a permanent mechanism in order to secure
the connection between capitalist abstraction from the real material world
and its necessary reconnection with it, a dialectic that is entirely internal to
the logic of capitalism. Why might this be the case? According to Marx,
capitalism treats money as if it had a life of its own. In a capitalist economy,
money is a reality in its own right, with power and agency. And in order to
enhance the power of money, capitalism turns human labour into a commod-
ity whose value is determined exclusively by its monetary market price.
4.2. Polanyi on the origins of capitalism
However, at this point one can notice that Marx’s critique of money does not
go far enough—philosophically, theologically or even economically. The capi-
talist economy, if left to itself, also treats land and social relations as com-
modities that can be priced by the interaction of demand and supply.As such,
the “free market” violates a universal ethical principle that governed virtually
all cultures in the pre-modern past (and many still during the modern age):
nature and human life were recognised as having a sacred dimension that can
neither be absolutely known nor comprehensively measured. In subordinat-
ing society and the environment to the abstract value of money, capitalism
does not just risk disrupting traditional cultures, as Marx pointed out. It can
also cause widespread social disintegration and ecological devastation, as
Karl Polanyi was first to argue.68
Polanyi’s seminal book The Great Transformation combines some Marxist
insights with elements of Christian socialism (via the influence of his friend
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theAnglo-Catholic historian R.H. Tawney) and an attention to the ontological
and ethical status of life and land. In this setting, Polanyi developed the
simple yet brilliant thesis that capitalism is secular because it ascribes uni-
versal value to commodity exchange and money alone, at the expense of the
social, political, symbolic, cosmic and even religious significance of each
person and all things. Historically and conceptually, the emergence of capi-
talism was not confined to a change in the social relations of ownership and
production, as Marx claimed. Rather, the capitalist economy was born when
perennial values like the sanctity of life and land were progressively aban-
doned, and so was the idea that everything has more than just material
meaning and economic utility. Stripped of their specific positions within
social relations and their cultural significance, people and property were
increasingly viewed as commodities whose value is determined by their
market price. Step by step, the market became “disembedded” from society
and money was enthroned as the measure of all things, producing not just
alienation, reification and commodified labour but also the commercialisa-
tion of human relations.
Once value and meaning have been displaced through the repeated expro-
priation of people and the concomitant commodification of life, Marx’s argu-
ment about the abstract nature of “capitalist money” is now no longer limited
to social property relations but thanks to Polanyi’s work takes on an onto-
logical significance. Here the point surely is that modern political economy
and notably capitalist practices reflect and defend the ontological and pos-
sessive individualism of Ockham and Hobbes, as I have suggested. Invest-
ment within a capitalist economy is not aimed at securing a return on long-
term productive capital but instead serves the purpose of maximizing liquid
capital held by “the few” who own assets. Financial speculation is the highest
reflection of this dynamic.69 Broadly speaking, liquid capital in search of
speculative possibilities tends to encounter two sets of obstacles, political and
social-cultural. In alliance with governments (and later transnational institu-
tions), capitalist agencies have attempted to abolish national and international
limits on the free flow of capital such as trade barriers, subsidies and other
political measures. Capitalism also tries to remove cultural restrictions on the
power of money because, like secular liberal democracy, capitalism opposes
those hierarchies of values and those social relations that limit formalisation,
commodification and financialisation.
As Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari put it, the capitalist mode is to drain
everything of its specific code, thus releasing desire and unleashing different
dynamics, including dispossession and migratory exodus. For this reason,
capitalism is coextensive with de-territorialisation. But since capitalism also
creates new possibilities and explores new territories, it is also always
already coextensive with re-territorialisation.70 In other words, capital is con-
stantly abstracted from the material world only to reconnect with it again.
Contrary to both orthodox Marxism and neo-liberalism, this dialectic is
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wholly internal to the logic of capitalism itself. For money must ultimately be
reinvested in physical processes, no matter how rarefied.71 And when there
is over-accumulation of capital and an under-use of physical resources and
“human” capital, capitalism suffers the sort of periodic crises that have
defined its history. But thus far it has always reinvented itself through finan-
cial innovation and the creation of new markets.72 Yet precisely for this
reason, financial turmoil is an essential feature of the capitalist process that
links expropriation of assets to the over-accumulation of capital, as the
eminent economic historian Charles Kindleberger has shown.73 The result of
most major financial crises has been a further concentration of wealth and
centralisation of power. With the exception perhaps of the 1920s and the
period from 1945 to the mid-1970s, this trend has characterised the succes-
sive waves of democratisation. In these ways one might say that democratic
rule has not been able to replace the capitalist tendency towards monopoly
and oligarchy with a system of sovereign relations that benefit “the many”,
not “the sovereign one” and “the few”.
4.3. The shared ontological premises of capitalism and democracy
There is another striking parallel between financial capitalism and liberal
secular democracy. Like the expansion of monetary value to virtually all areas
of life, democratic processes tend to extend the formality of the law and
procedural mechanisms to the entire range of social and communal activity.
But far from representing a thorough democratisation of power in favour of
“the many”, democratic rule in much of the nineteenth and the twentieth
century has been characterised by an increased usurping of sovereignty by
the executive branch of government.74 The problem is that this corrupting
tendency can flip over into a process of self-corruption, as a democratically
elected executive will claim the legitimate authority to exceed its own
mandate in the face of circumstances which could not be anticipated by that
mandate and which the electorate cannot vote on. The most recent example
that illustrates this point is the response to international Islamic terrorism. By
launching a “global war on terror”, many different democratic systems in the
West and elsewhere have declared a “state of exception” and suspended core
constitutional provisions like habeas corpus precisely in order to protect the
constitution from what they believe to be an existential threat.75 For this
reason, the controversial theorist Carl Schmitt was right to define the sover-
eign as “he who decides on the state of exception”.76 But when the executive
decrees the “state of exception”, the conceptual difference between democ-
racy and authoritarianism enters a zone of “in-distinction” where formal
democratic structures remain in place but where the value of human life is
neither universally equal nor absolutely sacrosanct. As mentioned in section
1 of this article, modern sovereign power blends the juridical-constitutional
model of state sovereignty with the “biopolitical” conception of power in
terms of domination over life itself.
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Thus, both financial capitalism and secular liberal democracy appear to be
governed by a basic dialectical tension. Just as capitalism oscillates between
accumulation-expansion and over-accumulation-contraction, so democracy
oscillates between constitutionally guaranteed popular sovereignty and con-
stitutionally sanctioned absolute sovereign power exercised by the executive
alone. But here one can go further. There is something that is more funda-
mental than the dialectical processes just described. Both democracy and
capitalism claim that unity emerges naturally out of multiplicity. The argu-
ment is that a natural multitude of rival individual egos will somehow
produce a single artificial order, either based on a social contract (Hobbes
and Locke) or via pre-contractual innate passions of sympathy and benevo-
lence (Hume and Smith). In either case, the violence of competing self-
interest is regulated by appeals to long-term interest and self-preservation,
but this original violence also needs policing via the law (Schmitt) and the
central state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force (Weber). From
Hobbes via Weber and Schmitt, modern “biopolitics” has not just extended
political power to all areas of natural and human life but also subordinated
the sacredness of life to state and market power.
The reason why the democratic-capitalist sovereign order is unstable yet
coherent is because it is largely abstract and virtual, though with very real
effects. By claiming that nature is somehow anarchic and ordered at the same
time and that human life is equally egoistic and altruistic, it situates violence
and peace at the same metaphysical level and makes them ontologically
equivalent. From a theological perspective, the equivalence of violence and
peace flattens themetaphysical hierarchy that structures the universe in terms
of degrees of being and perfection. Since modern democracy is almost exclu-
sively formal andprocedural anddoes not include any collective commitment
to substantive values, allmaterial and (increasingly) all immaterial realities are
subjected to the same standard of abstract value.77As a result, nature is drained
of any stablemeaning andhumans arenot associatedwith anyguidingfinality
or telos other than self-preservation. Reality is now assumed to disclose
nothing but the existing order, collapsing potency into actuality and conceiv-
ing the actual as an instantiation of abstract logical possibility.
But given that the nominal value of capital must be reinvested in real
material processes, the living universe is almost supplanted by a virtual
reality that operates on the basis of a vacuous generality. This is reflected by
the capitalist fetishisation of idealised commodities, the belief that the value
of material objects lies in their status as commodities instead of being
somehow both intrinsic to things and added to them by human labour. In
conjunction with the formalism of the rule of law that displaces organic
cultures, capitalism weakens real relations among actually existing things
because it privileges discrete, individual objects at the expense of the
social, cultural and religious structures and arrangements that bind them
together.
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By subjecting everything to standards of abstract value, capitalism and
democracy do not simply subsume the sacredness of life to state and
market sovereignty. They also supplant the sacred with a secular simu-
lacrum: first of all, the belief in abstract fetishes and in the primacy of
formal law and, secondly, the worship of the spectacle of idealised com-
modities and the tendency of secular liberal democracies to mutate into
post-democratic spectacular societies.78 Insofar as they replace real relations
among actually existing things with standards of nominal value to which
they nonetheless ascribe quasi-sacred status, both financial capitalism and
liberal secular democracy are “quasi-religions”.79 For these reasons, the
modern “biopolitical” model of state and market sovereignty requires for
its very operation (and not just as mere ideological obfuscation) a redefi-
nition of sanctity.
This is exemplified by the modern tradition of ontological atomism and
ethical positivism that has its roots not just in J.S. Mill’s utilitarian ethics and
Auguste Comte’s post-theistic religion of humanity but more fundamentally
in Ockham, Hobbes and notably Hume’s attempted destruction of all forms
of theism. Once the metaphysical link between Creator and creation ceases to
be rationally intelligible and becomes a matter of blind belief, ethics and
political economy lack a conception of universal and objective common good
in which all can share. The consequences of abandoning any form of tran-
scendence and teleology are encapsulated in Peter Singer’s call to “unsanc-
tify” human life and to extend euthanasia to “severely and irreparably
retarded infants” and those forms of human and nonhuman life whose
medical condition causes “suffering to all concerned and benefit nobody”.80
Taken to its logical conclusion, the secular denial that all life is sacrosanct
sustains modern “biopolitics”—fetishising the power to redefine life as
“bare” and take it away from those who have received it as a divine gift of
love and grace.
5. The Shape of a Post-Secular Politics and Economics
None of this is to suggest that state and market sovereignty is inevitably
wedded to the modern “biopolitical” imperative or that democracy and
capitalism have not had some positive effect on the liberty and prosperity of
“the many”. But neither the state and the market in themselves nor demo-
cratic principles and capitalist economies will be able to achieve the utilitar-
ian aim of securing the greatest happiness of the greatest number—not to
mention a theological vision of the universal common good open to all. It is
now clear that the modern divorce of religion from politics reinforces the
absolutism of secular reason and the “dictatorship of relativism which does
not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely
of one’s own ego and desires”, as Joseph Ratzinger put it shortly before his
election as Pope.81 Given that secular liberal democracy and unbridled “free-
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market” capitalism have so clearly failed to deliver universal freedom and
prosperity, it is perhaps no longer surprising—though no less significant—
that theology is having a major public impact on the impasse of modern
secularism and the Enlightenment. In a landmark debate in 2004, Jürgen
Habermas agreed with the then Cardinal Ratzinger that we are now in a
“post-secular” phase where religious and other ideological bodies should be
able to express themselves directly in their own terms within the public
square.82 However, for Habermas the norms to regulate this debate must
remain secular and liberal (procedural and majoritarian). For Ratzinger, by
contrast, there must be a plural search for a shared common good, which he
does not say is merely pre-given in natural law and abstract reason, for that
is part of the logic of neo-scholasticism which is inextricably intertwined with
modern rationalism and fideism. In the Pope’s case a re-invention of consti-
tutional corporatism in a more pluralist guise against modern liberalism is
linked both to an insistence on the fundamental metaphysical relationality of
all beings and on the indelible role of basic social units above the level of the
individual.
Equally such a post-secular politics and economics is linked to a stress—
encouraged by other Catholic thinkers who have influenced Ratzinger like
Robert Spaemann, Luigi Giussani and Alasdair MacIntyre83—that education
as the transmission and exploration of the truth is as fundamental a dimen-
sion of politics as the will of a democratic majority. In this light, those who
brand the Pope as hopelessly conservative and reactionary have not
grasped his critique of both left and right. Since the modern political right
has always focused on the absolute power of “the one” and the arbitrary
right to decide on the state of exception (Schmitt), while the modern left
has insisted on an equally absolute right of “the many” to found and with-
draw legitimacy (Foucault), both can be taken to ignore the primacy of
natural and cultural relation, and of the mediating role of “the few” con-
cerned with truth and virtue.84 A political economy focused on the latter
would be a more theological option which would define the secular realm
as concerned with things in time and with necessary coercion, only through
its ultimate outlook towards transcendent norms which alone supply ulti-
mate standards beyond the will either of “the one” or of “the many.” As
such, Benedict’s political critique of value-free democracy and capitalism
and his social and cultural critique of the “dictatorship of relativism” are of
a piece with his defence of the Hellenic metaphysics of relationality and the
Biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo in his controversial Regensburg
address.85
By making these complex links in the Regensburg lecture which were
clearly lost on most commentators, the Pope was asking nothing less than
whether our politics of “right and left” remains caught within shared
secular, liberal axioms. These axioms are also those of theocratic fundamen-
talisms since they equally deal in a politics of the indifferent will, inher-
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ited—as is also the case in the end for liberalism—from the theological
nominalism and voluntarism of the late Middle Ages, as I indicated in
section 2. This is not at all to search for a new middle “third way” that is as
conceptually empty as it is practically non-transformative.86 On the con-
trary, Benedict’s post-secular politics and economics is a quest for a way
that cannot be charted on our current conceptual map. He seeks to retrieve
notions of fundamental relationality, of the common good, and of principles
which can determine appropriate “mixtures” of government as between
“the one”, “the few” and “the many”; the centre and localities; political
government and pre-political society; international community and nations;
education in time and government in space; absolute right and free deci-
sion; economic freedom and just distribution as well as—finally—between
secular and religious authorities.
In his most recent encyclical “Caritas in veritate” (Charity in Truth),87 Pope
Benedict XVI develops his vision of economic democracy with mixed politi-
cal and civil arrangements. Like the Regensburg address, the social encyclical
deploys a pre-secular metaphysics and anthropology in order to develop a
post-secular politics and economics. At the heart of the theological vision
underpinning this remarkable document lies the uniquely Christian Catholic
idea that human, social and natural reality is irreducibly relational and that all
is ordered by the divine “economy of charity” to the highest Good in God. By
calling for an economic system that is re-embedded in civil society and
sustains both human and natural life, the Pope has outlined a new ethical
compact and a political economy that transcend the old secular dichotomies
of state vs. market and left vs. right without however endorsing a quasi-
Suárezian unitary world government.
The commonly held belief that the left protects the state against the market
while the right privileges the market over the state is economically false and
politically dubious, as Pope Benedict intimates. Just as the left now views the
market as the most efficient delivery mechanism for private wealth and
public welfare, so the right has always relied on the state to secure the
property rights of the affluent and to turn small proprietors into cheap wage
labourers by stripping them of their land and traditional networks of
support. This ambivalence of left and right masks a more fundamental col-
lusion of state and market. The state enforces and polices the centralized and
standardized legal framework that enables the market to extend contractual
and monetary relations into virtually all areas of life. In so doing, both state
and market reduce nature, human labour and social ties to commodities
whose value is priced exclusively by the iron law of demand and supply.
However, the commodification of each person and all things transgresses
universal ethical and social taboos that have characterized most cultures in
the past—nature and human life have almost always been recognised as
having a sacred dimension, as I indicated in section 3. By contrast, Christian
theology defends the sanctity of life and land against the subordination by
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the “market-state” of everything and everyone to mere material meaning and
quantifiable economic utility.
The Pope repudiates equally the left-wing adulation of the state and the
right-wing fetishization of the market because ultimately both collude at the
expense of alternative, more diffuse and plural forms of economic and
political organisation, legitimacy and authority. This is why the Pope writes
that “the exclusively binary model of market-plus-State is corrosive of
society, while economic forms based on solidarity, which find their natural
home in civil society without being restricted to it, build up society” (39).
Notably, Benedict does not simply endorse civil society in its present con-
figuration precisely because the actors and institutions of civil society are
currently subject to the administrative and symbolic order of the secular
“market-state”. Nor can his call for “a true world political authority” (67)
be taken as an argument in favour of a unitary global government. Instead,
the Pope calls for a new kind of settlement whereby both the centralized
bureaucratic state and the unfettered global free-market are transformed in
order to serve the genuine needs and interests of persons, communities and
the environment. Benedict argues that more global coordination and coop-
eration is required in order to address worldwide issues such as capital
flows and climate change. Far from generating greater centralisation and
concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the most powerful
nations, the Pope invokes the twin principles of subsidiarity and solidarity
that are among the core tenets of Catholic social teaching.88 Since subsid-
iarity calls for action at the appropriate level to uphold human dignity and
reciprocal relations, Benedict’s insistence on greater political authority at
the international level blends universal principles and particular traditions.
That’s why he writes that this new order
would have to have the authority to ensure compliance with its decisions
from all parties, and also with the coordinated measures adopted in
various international forums. Without this, despite the great progress
accomplished in various sectors, international law would risk being con-
ditioned by the balance of power among the strongest nations. The inte-
gral development of peoples and international cooperation require the
establishment of a greater degree of international ordering, marked by
subsidiarity, for the management of globalization (67).
To achieve a civil economy at the global and local levels, the Pope argues that
state and market must be re-embedded within a wider network of social
relations and governed by virtues and universal principles such as justice,
solidarity, fraternity and responsibility. Concretely, Benedict encourages the
creation of enterprises that operate on the basis of mutualist principles like
cooperatives or employee-owned businesses. These businesses pursue not
just private profit but also social ends by reinvesting their profit in the
company and in the community instead of simply enriching the top manage-
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ment or institutional shareholders. The Pope also supports professional asso-
ciations and other intermediary institutions wherein workers and owners
can jointly determine just wages and fair prices. Against the free-market
concentration of wealth and state-controlled redistribution of income, Bene-
dict proposes a more radical programme: labour receives assets (in the form
of stake-holdings) and hires capital (not vice-versa), while capital itself comes
in part from worker- and community-supported credit unions rather than
exclusively from shareholder-driven retail banks (38). Concrete examples
include the Basque cooperative Mondragón which employs over 100,000
workers who produce manufactured goods, with an annual turnover of
around US $3 billion.
Moreover, the Pope urges us to view profit and technological innovation no
longer as ends in themselves but as means to secure the stability of busi-
nesses, their employees and the communities hosting them. Like the
“market-state”, money and science must be re-embedded within social rela-
tions and support rather than destroy mankind’s organic ties with nature. For
example, the world economy needs to switch from short-term financial
speculation to long-term investment in the real economy, social development
and environmental sustainability.
Taken together, these and others ideas developed in the encyclical go
beyond piecemeal reform and amount to a wholesale transformation of the
secular logic underpinning the “market-state”. Alongside private contracts
and public provisions, the Pope seeks to introduce the logic of gift-giving and
gift-exchange into the economic process. Benedict’s key argument is that
market exchange of goods and services cannot properly work without the
free, gratuitous gift of mutual trust and reciprocity so badly undermined by
the global credit crunch. That’s why he writes that “the principle of gratu-
itousness and the logic of gift as an expression of fraternity can and must find
their place within normal economic activity” (36).
This vision is neither reactionary nor nostalgic. To the contrary, Benedict
retrieves and extends the notion of “integral human development” first
proposed by Pope Paul VI forty years ago. Socio-economic development can
only be humane if it promotes relationships of reciprocal self-giving in love,
which is “the principle not only of micro-relationships (with friends, with
family members or within small groups) but also of macro-relationships
(social, economic and political ones)” (2). The concrete experience of love
alerts us to the truth that life itself is God’s loving gift. Benedict, referring to
his first encyclical Deus est Caritas (God is Love), writes that “everything has
its origin in God’s love, everything is shaped by it, everything is directed
towards it. Love is God’s greatest gift to humanity, it is his promise and our
hope” (2). If we are indeed made in the image and likeness of God, then
divine Trinitarian relationality is dimly reflected in the structures of the
cosmos and within social, economic and political relations among human
beings.
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Conclusion
The real alternative to modern “biopolitics” and sovereign power is to envi-
sion a new sort of post-secular political economy beyond modern secular
liberal norms. Such a vision abandons the formalism of abstract representa-
tion and subjective rights in favour of a substantive account of the relational
Good which orders relations within the cosmopolis in line with transcendent
standards of justice and a fair share for all. In this way, we can imagine a
radically communitarian and associative virtue politics and virtue economy.
NOTES
1 I am indebted to the Leverhulme Trust for awarding me an Early Career Fellowship which
supported this research. Comments and suggestions from John Milbank and several anony-
mous readers for Modern Theology are gratefully acknowledged and have significantly
improved this essay.
2 Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes: essai d’anthropologie symétrique (Paris: La
Découverte, 1991).
3 Catherine Pickstock, “Modernity and scholasticism: A critique of recent invocations of
univocity”, Antonianum Vol. 78 (2003), pp. 3–46.
4 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978–1979 (Paris:
Seuil, 2004).
5 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty. How ideas shaped modern international relations
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
6 The terms “féodalité” and “système féodal” were coined at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, and the English words “feudality” and “feudalism” were in use by the end of the
following century. Susan Reynolds has documented that Marc Bloch’s idea of an all-
encompassing, oppressive feudal regime across medieval Europe distorts the socio-
economic, political and cultural reality of the High Middle Ages. See her Fiefs and Vassals.
The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Likewise, the
doctrine of the divine right of kings was an early modern innovation that departed from the
patristic and medieval opposition to the sacralisation of secular power. See John Neville
Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1896).
7 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990);
Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century. Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times
(London: Verso, 1994).
8 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York, NY: Colum-
bia University Press, 1996), pp. 1–32; John Gray, False Dawn. The Delusions of Global Capitalism
(London: Granta, 1998), pp. 22–77. For a theological critique of the secular logic underpin-
ning the nation-state and the global economy, see William T. Cavanaugh, “Killing for the
Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State is not the Keeper of the Common Good”,
Modern Theology Vol. 20 no. 2 (April, 2004), pp. 243–274.
9 Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. F. W. Maitland (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1900), pp. 1–100; O. Gierke, Associations and the Law: The Classical
and Early Christian Stages, trans. George Heinrich, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1977), pp. 143–160; Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval
Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 42–86, 193–313; Susan
Reynolds, Country, Kingdom and Community in Western Europe: 900–1500 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), pp. 1–11.
10 Ockham’s and Hobbes’s account of sovereign power will be discussed in section 2.
11 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings—Volume 1
(1913–1926), ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1996), pp. 236–252; Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, pp. 77–103, 295–320;
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen,
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 30–38, 104–125.
Modern Sovereignty in Question 597
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
12 Michel Foucault, “Omnes et singulatim: towards a criticism of political reason (1979)”, in The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. S. M. McMurrin, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), Vol. 2, pp. 225–254.
13 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). On pre-
modern instances of systematic state disciplining and punishment, see R.I. Moore, Formation
of a Persecuting Society. Power and deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250 (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1987). The key difference between pre-modern and modern institutions and practices
seems to be not just the degree of centralisation but, more fundamentally, the underlying
logic: medieval punishment was predominantly linked to religious questions of heresy and
unbelief, whereas in the modern era this was supplanted by a growing focus on secular
stigmatisation such as race and the monopoly of state control over people and territories.
14 John Hicks, A Theory of Economic History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 47–57;Arrighi,
The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 85–96.
15 On the nominalist and voluntarist foundations of modern philosophy and political thought,
see André de Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique. De Scot, Occam et Suárez au libéralisme
contemporain (Paris: Vrin, 2002).
16 Adrian Pabst, “The Primacy of Relation over Substance and the Recovery of a Theological
Metaphysics”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 81 (2007), pp. 553–578.
17 Christopher Lash, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (NewYork, NY: Norton
& Co., 1995), pp. 25–49; Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp.
1–69.
18 Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted
Totalitarianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. x.
19 This thesis is not exclusive to the writings associated with Radical Orthodoxy. See the earlier
work of Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity. An essay in the hermeneutics of nature and culture
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 15–90. Cf. André de Muralt, “Kant, le
dernier occamien. Une nouvelle définition de la philosophie moderne”, Revue de Métaphy-
sique et de Morale Vol. 80 (1975), pp. 32–53; idem, “La structure de la philosophie politique
moderne”, Souveraineté et pouvoir. Cahiers de la Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie Vol. 2
(1978), pp. 3–84; idem, L’unité de la philosophie politique, pp. 7–87; Michael Allen Gillespie, The
Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp.
19–43.
20 John Duns Scotus, Opus oxoniese I, d. III, q. iii, in Duns Scotus. Philosophical Writings, ed. and
trans. Allan Wolter O.F.M., (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), pp. 4–8; Duns Scotus, Reporta-
tio, I A, prol. q. III, a. I, in Philosophical Writings, pp. 9–12; Duns Scotus, Opus oxoniese, I, d. III,
q. I, in Philosophical Writings, pp. 14–33. Cf. Olivier Boulnois, “Analogie et univocité selon
Duns Scot: la double destruction”, Les Etudes Philosophiques Vol. 3 (1989), pp. 347–369; O.
Boulnois, Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l”époque de Duns
Scot (XIIIe-XIVe siècle) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), pp. 223–291. For a
recent debate on Duns Scotus, see the special issue of Modern Theology Vol.21 no. 4 (October,
2005) with contributions by Catherine Pickstock, Thomas Williams, Matthew Webb Lever-
ing, Olivier Boulnois, Mary Beth Ingham and Emmanuel Perrier OP.
21 William of Ockham, Ordinatio sive Scriptum in libros Sententiarum, I, d. III, q. vii and q. viii,
in Ockham. Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. Philotheus Boehner O.F.M. and rev. Stephen
F. Brown, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1990), pp. 41–45.
22 William of Ockham, Quodlibeta, VI, q. vi, in Guillelmi de Ockham. Opera Theologica, ed.
Gedeon Gál et alii, (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1967–84), Vol. IX. Cf. William
Courtenay, Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power
(Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina, 1990), pp. 119–126.
23 Ockham, Ordinatio, I, d. 2 q. 6, in Opera Theologica, Vol. VII, p. 350. On singularity in Ockham,
see Pierre Alféri, Guillaume d’Ockham. Le Singulier (Paris: Minuit, 1989), pp. 15–146. For a
different account, see Marilyn M. Adams, William of Ockham (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1987), Vol. I, pp. 3–141.
24 “[. . .] nihil est unum et idem in utroque, sed quidquid est in uno simpliciter et absolute de se non est
aliquid quod est in alio”, in Ockham, Ordinatio, I d. 2 q. 6, in Opera Theologica, Vol. VII, p. 350.
25 William of Ockham, Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico [On Tyrannical Rule], III, 13, in
Wilhelm von Ockham als politischer Denker und sein Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico, ed. R.
Scholz (Leipzig: SRADG, 1952), p. 113.
598 Adrian Pabst
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
26 Ockham, Breviloq., III, 7–8, 14–15 and IV, 8, in Wilhelm von Ockham als politischer Denker und
sein Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico, pp. 125–128, 136–140, 153–158; Ockham, Dialogus de
imperio et pontificia potestate, III 2, 3; 2, 5–10.
27 Ockham, Dialogus de imperio et pontificia potestate, III, 2, 3, vi. On Marsilius, seeAlan Gewirth,
Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 1951), pp. 237–248.
28 Alain Boureau, La Religion de l’État. La construction de la République étatique dans le discours
théologique de l’Occident médiéval, 1250–1350 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2006), pp. 111–177. Cf.
Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church & State, 1050–1300 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1964).
29 A.S. McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1974), pp. 78–172, 197–206.
30 Janet Coleman, “Ockham’s right reason and the genesis of the political as ’absolutist’”,
History of Political Thought Vol. XX (1999), pp. 35–64, quote at pp. 48, 50.
31 Francisco Suárez, De Legibus, Ac Deo Legislatore, Book III, ii, 3, in Franciscus Suarez. Opera
omnia, ed. Michel André (Paris: Vivès, 1856–1887), Vol. IV, p. 374 (my translation).
32 Francisco Suárez, Defensio fidei, Book III, i, 7; III, iv, 1, in Franciscus Suarez. Opera omnia, Vol.
II, pp. 191, 227.
33 Suárez, De Leg., III, ii, 3–4, in Franciscus Suarez. Opera omnia, Vol. IV, pp. 370–375.
34 Suárez, De Leg., III, ii, 3, in Franciscus Suarez. Opera omnia, Vol. IV, p. 374 (my translation).
35 Divine grace is now construed as being so extrinsic that the communal dimension of the
mystical community is completed naturalised. The state of nature is independent of human
“creatureliness” and it defines the space within which the extrinsically given desire for the
supernatural operates. According to Suárez, nature is not infused with this desire by God’s
supernatural grace, as it is for Aquinas. See Henri de Lubac, Corpus mysticum. L’Eucharistie
et l’Église au moyen âge (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1949), pp. 123–152.
36 Suárez, De Legibus, III, iv, 6; III, iv, 11, in Franciscus Suarez. Opera omnia, Vol. IV, pp. 387, 391.
37 On Aquinas’ opposition to tyrannical rule, see his De Regno [On Kingship], I, c. VI, XI-XIV,
in Aquinas: Political Writings, ed. and trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), pp. 16–21, 30–39. On Thomas’ critique of tyrannical law, see Summa Theologiae,
I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 4. On his endorsement of a mixed government combining kinship and
popular participation, see Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 95 and q. 105.
38 “Ergo quamvis rex habuerit a populo illud dominium per donationem vel contractum, non ideo
licebit populo dominium regis auferre libertatem suam iterum”, in Suárez, Defensio fidei, III, iii, 2,
in Franciscus Suarez. Opera omnia, Vol. II, p. 441 (my translation).
39 Jean-François Courtine, Nature et Empire de la Loi. Etudes suaréziennes (Paris: Vrin, 1999), pp.
8–43.
40 Cf. José Ferrater Mora, “Suárez and Modern Philosophy”, Journal of the History of Ideas Vol.14
(1953), pp. 528–547; Cf. Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique, pp. 89–114.
41 The medieval argument is that the Incarnation restored the “visibility” of the primacy of
peace over violence in Christ and that the living, apostolic tradition of the church transmits
this mediated revelation. As such, the tradition binds together the distinct—though comple-
mentary—accounts of divine revelation in the Book of Scripture, the Book of Nature and the
Book of History. See Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale: Les Quatre Sens de l’Écriture (Paris:
Aubier-Montaigne, 1964), pp. première partie, chap. I, 2 and 5, pp. 56–74, 100–118; chap. III,
pp. 171–220; chap. V, pp. 305–372.
42 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and
Civil (1651), ed. and intro. Michael Oakeshott, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), part I, ch. XI,
XIII-XIV; part. II, ch. XXI, XXVIII and XXXII.
43 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, reprint of 1651 edition (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing,
1994), chap. 1, sections XII and XIII, pp. 17–18; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, chap. XIII,
p. 82.
44 Hobbes, Leviathan, part II, chap. XVII-XX, pp. 109–136.
45 Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, chap. XVI, p. 107 (editor’s italics).
46 Even if some of C.B. MacPherson’s textual analysis is questionable, his argument in respect
of modern political and economic thought is broadly correct, in particular the centrality of
“market relations” in the work of Hobbes and Locke. C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory
of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), pp. 34–95.
Modern Sovereignty in Question 599
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
47 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp. 30–38, 104–115; John Milbank, “Paul against Biopolitics”, Theory,
Culture & Society Vol. 25 (2008), pp. 125–172.
48 John Neville Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414–1625 (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1916), pp. 1–115; JosephR. Strayer,On theMedieval Origins of the
Modern State (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1970); PerryAnderson, Lineages of the
Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974), pp. 15–59, 195–235, 397–431; Thomas Ertman, Birth of
the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge:
Polity, 1997); For a theological critique of the violent origins and secular foundations of the
modern state, seeWilliamT. Cavanaugh, “‘A Fire Strong Enough toConsume theHouse’: The
Wars of Religion and the Rise of State”, Modern Theology Vol. 11 no 3 (July, 1995), pp. 397–420.
49 Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” in The Formation of
National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1975), pp. 3–83, quote at p. 42. Cf. Michael Howard, “War and the nation state”,
Daedalus Vol.108 (1979), esp. p. 102; Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berke-
ley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 1–2, 52–53; Bruce D. Porter, War and the
Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994);
Victor Lee Burke, The Clash of Civilizations: War-Making & State Formation in Europe (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 1997); Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
50 Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings, pp. 135–136.
51 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York, NY: Russell Sage,
1984), p. 147.
52 Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals; Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, esp. pp. 101–153, 250–331;
R.I. Moore, The First European Revolution, c. 970–1215 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 30–64,
112–158; Julia M.H. Smith, Europe after Rome: A New Cultural History 500–1000 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 151–216, 253–292.
53 On the medieval idea of “complex space”, see John Milbank, The Word Made Strange.
Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 268–292.
54 Dimitri Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453 (London: Sphere
Books, 1974).
55 Robert Brenner, “Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial
Europe”, Past & Present Vol. 70 (1976), pp. 30–74; idem, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial
Change, Political Conflict and London’s Overseas Traders 1550–1653 (London: Verso, 2003).
56 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648. Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International
Relations (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 215–275.
57 Cf. D.K. Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution. From Calvin to the Civil
Constitution, 1560–1791 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
58 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 161–174; Luciano Pellicani, The Genesis of Capitalism
and the Origins of Modernity, trans. James G. Colbert, (New York, NY: Telos Press, 1994), pp.
147–202.
59 According to Robert Kagan, this vision of “moralism, idealism, exceptionalism, militarism,
and global ambition” was first defended by America’s founding fathers and has always
shaped US foreign policy. Robert Kagan, “Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, c.1776”, World
Affairs (2008), pp. 13–35.
60 Prominent examples include John Cotton, Cotton Mather, Solomon Stoddard, Jonathan
Edwards and much later, Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of Wealth. For a theological account of
the role of some strands of Puritanism and Calvinism in the genesis of capitalism, see R.H.
Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, rev. ed. and intro. Adam B. Seligman, (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), pp. 79–132. For a detailed exposition of how Calvinist
and Puritanical ideas and practices shaped the emergence and evolution of American
capitalism and was shaped by the American society it became rooted in, see Menna
Prestwich (ed.), International Calvinism, 1541–1715 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) and Mark
Valeri, “Religion and the Culture of the Market in Early New England” in Peter W. Williams
(ed), Perspectives on American Religion and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 92–104. On
Calvinism as the link between American capitalism and liberalism, see H. Richard Niebuhr,
The Social Sources of Denominationalism, repr. (New York: Holt, 1957), esp. pp. 94–95 where he
suggests that there is a “harmony of the Calvinist conception of individual rights and
responsibilities with the interests of the middle class” and “Laissez-faire and the spirit of
600 Adrian Pabst
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
political liberalism have flourished most in countries where the influence of Calvinism was
greatest”. Cf. Walter Russell Mead, God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the
Modern World (London: Atlantic Books, 2007) and William E. Connolly, Capitalism and
Christianity, American Style (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 17–68.
61 Overarching accounts in support of this thesis can be found in John Milbank, Theology and
Social Theory. Beyond secular reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) and Charles Taylor, A Secular
Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). Cf. Gillespie, The Theological Origins
of Modernity, pp. 255–288.
62 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, intro. E. Hobsbawn (London:
Verso, 1998), pp. 39–40.
63 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, intro. D. D.
Raphael (London: Random, 1991), Vol. I, Book IV, introduction, p. 375.
64 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Vol. II, Book IV, chapter 7, pp. 121–122.
65 Amartya Sen, “Open and Closed Impartiality”, The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 99 (2002), pp.
445–469; A. Sen, “What Do We Want fromA Theory of Justice?”, The Journal of Philosophy Vol.
103 (2006), pp. 215–238; Knud Haakonssen and Donald Winch, “The Legacy ofAdam Smith”
in The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), pp. 366–394; David D. Raphael, The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s
moral philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); Emma Rothschild, Economic Sen-
timents. Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001); Andrew S. Skinner, A System of Social Science: Papers Relating to Adam Smith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), esp. pp. 123–144; Donald Winch and Patrick
O’Brien (eds), The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
66 Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing. Lineages of the Twenty-First Century (London: Verso,
2007), pp. 1–68.
67 Karl Marx, Capital: Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, (London: Penguin, 1990),
vol. 1, pp. 877–896.
68 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston,
MA: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]), pp. 35–58.
69 Since the inception of central state formation and capital accumulation in the early modern
era, the system has undergone periodic crises that tended to be linked to the convergence
between political rule and finance capital. See Fernand Braudel’s trilogy Civilisation matéri-
elle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Ed. Armand Colin, 1979), vol. 1, pp.
499–545 and vol. 2, pp. 618–667.
70 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophrénie: L’Anti-Œdipe (Paris: Ed. de
Minuit, 1972); Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophrénie: Mille plateaux
(Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1980).
71 As Fernand Braudel argues, the international movement of capital is characterized by
increasing degrees abstraction from the layers of the everyday economy. At the top of this
economic pyramid sits global finance, seeking returns anywhere, uncommitted to any
particular place or industry, and subjecting anything and everything to market valuation
and commodification. At the same time, even the latest, obscure financial instruments such
as credit default swaps and derivative trading do not only make money from money but are
ultimately tied to physical assets such as residential and commercial real estate or primary
commodities. As such, finance capitalism expands by generating ever-greater nominal profit
and by commodifying ever-greater areas of life (education, health, social relations, the
family, sex, etc.).
72 Robert Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy (London: Verso, 2002);
Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money. A Financial History of the World (London: Allen Lane,
2008).
73 Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, fifth
edition, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005).
74 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell, (Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 1–40.
75 Jean-Claude Paye, La fin de l’Etat de droit: La lutte antiterroriste, de l’état d’exception à la dictature
(Paris: La Dispute, 2004), trans. Global War on Liberty (New York, NY: Telos Press Publishing,
2007).
Modern Sovereignty in Question 601
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
76 ’Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet”, in Carl Schmitt, Politische
Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität (Munich/Leipzig: Duncker und
Humbolt, 1922), p. 11.
77 Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. A study in moral theory, second edition, (London: Duck-
worth, 1985).
78 First intimated in Alexis de Tocqueville’s De la démocratie en Amérique (1835–1840), the rise
of spectacular societies is described in Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class
(1899) and finds its highest expression thus far in the work of Guy Debord. See his books La
Société du Spectacle (Paris: Ed. Buchet-Chastel, 1967) and Le déclin et la chute de l’économie
spectaculaire-marchande (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1993). Cf. Crouch, Post-Democracy, pp. 1–52,
78–123.
79 Walter Benjamin, “Capitalism as Religion”, in Selected Writings, pp. 288–291; Cf. Philip
Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety (London: Routledge, 2002); Philip
Goodchild, The Theology of Money (Norwich: SCM Press, 2007).
80 Peter Singer, Unsanctifying Human Life: Essays on Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 225.
81 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Homily during the mass pro eligendo romano pontifice”, 18 April
2005, online at http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_
20050418_en.html
82 Jürgen Habermas und Joseph Ratzinger, Dialektik der Säkularisierung. Über Vernunft und
Religion (Freiburg: Herder, 2004); trans. The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion
(San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007).
83 Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), pp. 15–19, 66–67, 57–63, 112–115.
84 John Milbank, “Preface: The Politics of Paradox”, in idem, The Future of Love: Essays in Political
Theology (London: SCM, 2009), pp. ix-xix.
85 Pope Benedict XVI, “Glaube, Vernunft und Universität. Erinnerungen und Reflexionen”,
lecture at the University of Regensburg on 12 September 2006, published as Glaube und
Vernunft. Die Regensburger Vorlesung (Freiburg: Herder, 2006); The Regensburg Lecture, trans.
James V. Schall S.J. (Chicago, IL: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007).
86 The hallmark of “third-way” centrism—in the 1930s and the 1990s—was to marry the
unbridled free market with a centralised bureaucracy, replacing the modern warfare state
and the national state with the late modern welfare state and the globalised market state.
This complicit collusion of state and market, which first emerged in the Anglo-Saxon world,
enforced the “Washington consensus” by promoting a concentration of power and wealth at
the expense of individual dignity, communal flourishing and a commonweal of associations
mediating between the person and the collectivity.
87 Benedict XVI, “Caritas in Veritate”, available online at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-
veritate_en.html. References to the section of the encyclical will be in brackets in the main
text.
88 Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor. A Hundred Years of Vatican Social Teaching (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 1992).
602 Adrian Pabst
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
